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hina’s ongoing relationship with the African continent has typically been 
characterized as a double-edged sword. On one hand, lucrative socio-economic 
partnerships promise an African utopia of infrastructural development, economic 
self-sufficiency, and a vibrant Sino-African cultural exchange. On the other hand, 
though, China’s approach to investment in Africa motivates worries about its facilitation of 
economic dependency.1 Even more sinister is the prediction that under such a regime, some 
African countries may have to cede political and economic control to China to preserve the 
promise of a vibrant economy. These two future scenarios have been variously characterized 
by observers as paranoia associated with China’s ‘compassion capitalism’ in Africa and 
genuine concern about ‘what the catch is’. What remains clear, however, is that these 
ostensibly generous Chinese investments on the continent come with far-reaching 
implications.  
 
1 Padraig Carmody, “Dependence Not Debt-Trap Diplomacy,” Area Development and Policy 5, no. 1 (January 




A significant facet of this link between China and Africa is migration – Chinese nationals 
have had to relocate to Africa to realize China’s dream in the region2. This has created 
compelling scenarios for the growing Chinese diaspora dispersed all over the African 
continent, and the central goal of this paper is to ascertain whether the presence and 
activities of this diaspora in Ghana constitutes a form of neo-imperialism.  
 
This paper will examine societal patterns that are peculiar to shifts in hegemony and ask 
whether or not these shifts constitute a new, diaspora-led Chinese imperialism in Ghana. For 
this purpose, we will situate our conception of the term ‘diaspora’ to reflect Walker Conor’s 
definition: any group of individuals whose livelihoods depend on an existence outside the 
homeland3. Such a broad definition is helpful because, in the case of the Chinese diaspora, 
this definition acknowledges the diversity in the reasoning behind relocating to Africa. In the 
case of Ghana, the diverse range of Chinese migrants includes engineering professionals on 
one end of the spectrum and mining laborers on the other. A further merit of Conor’s 
definition is that it is adaptable to the potential change in the status of this Chinese diaspora 
within the structures of Ghanaian society if our neo-imperialism thesis is proven valid. This 
idea of a change in migrant status is inferred from Edward Said's “Reflections on Exile” in 
which he asserts that “White [European] settlers in Africa may once have been exiles, but as 
pioneers and nation-builders, the label ‘exile’ dropped from them.4” Said’s claim is further 
confirmed by an argument advanced by some African scholars that these white settlers 
played an integral role in advancing the three phases of imperialism in Africa. The first phase 
of European expansion into Africa involved land and mineral resource exploitation starting 
in the nineteenth century. The second phase, which started in the twentieth century, 
complemented this material exploitation with ideological indoctrination with the purpose of 
maintaining neo-colonial ties. The third phase, which according to these scholars is ongoing, 
includes non-white settlers and involves a pursuit of free trade ideals by opening up Africa’s 
existing economies to global capitalism5. If we can demonstrate that the Chinese diaspora 
facilitates, or has facilitated, any of these three phases of imperialism in Ghana, we would be 
confirmed in our neo-imperialism thesis.  
 
2 Xiaoyang Tang, “8 Geese Flying to Ghana? A Case Study of the Impact of Chinese Investments on Africa’s 
Manufacturing Sector,” Journal of Contemporary China 27, no. 114 (November 2018): 925, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1488106. 
3 Connor Walker, “The Impact of Homelands Upon Diasporas,” in Modern Diasporas in International Politics. 
ed Gabi Sheffer (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 16. 
4 Edward Said, “Reflections on Exile,” in Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2000), 181. 
5 Munoda Mararike, “The New Scramble for Africa: Re Colonising the Continent,” in Zimbabwe Will Never Be a 
Colony Again!: Sanctions and Anti-Imperialist Struggles in Zimbabwe (Mankon, Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG, 
2019), 257-8. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvmd84jt.14. 
 3 
Other than Said’s formulation, Hannah Arendt’s identification of imperialism as the first 
manifestation of capitalist political control gives salience to the possibility that if Chinese 
economic practices are making Ghana perpetually dependent on Chinese investments, the 
country could eventually exert political and cultural dominance on Ghana6. Arendt suggests 
that “Imperialism was born when the ruling class in capitalist production came up against 
national limitations to its economic expansion.7” Arendt’s theory allows us to infer that an 
economically disenfranchised Chinese population could be turned into international foot 
soldiers of Chinese expansion abroad. Whether the Chinese diaspora in Ghana fits this 
characterization is something this paper will have to establish, but Arendt’s proposition at 
least presents the possibility for such an inquiry.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, neo-imperialism constitutes a scenario where the 
dominant hegemonic discourses in Ghana have been replaced by Chinese socio-cultural, 
political, and economic ideals. A reliable way to gauge the existence of this scenario would 
be to review the economic and labor relations, educational curriculum, and political 
ideologies that shape the relationship between Ghana and China. 
 
In terms of economic and labor relations between the two countries, China had invested 
a total of $11.5 billion into the Ghanaian economy by the end of 2019. A majority of its 
investments have been in the energy, transport, real estate, and metal industries. Other than 
these, China has also made significant investments in agriculture, chemicals, utilities, and 
logistics. Jointly considered, these industries represent the backbone of the Ghanaian 
economy8. 
 
Starting in 2005, phases of Chinese investment came to be accompanied by waves of 
migration into Ghana. The first wave mostly comprised technocrats working on various 
developmental projects9. As of 2018, there were 3,082 Chinese workers in Ghana, up from 
1,591 in 2009; these numbers mostly represented technocrats from the Guangdong region 
of China10. As soon as these technocrats settled in Ghana, they were joined by their family 
members. Increasingly, these technocrats started to function as chaperones for Chinese 
 
6 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), 138. 
7 Arendt, 126. 
8 “Chinese Investments and Contracts in Ghana (2005-2019),” China Global Investment Tracker, American 
Enterprise Institute, accessed April 6, 2021, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/. 
9 Antoine Kernen and Katy N. Lam, “Workforce Localization Among Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
in Ghana,” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 90 (November 2014): 1059, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.898894. 
10 “Data: Chinese Workers in Africa,” China Africa Research Initiative, accessed April 6, 2021, http://www.sais-
cari.org/data-chinese-workers-in-africa. 
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businesses seeking to invest in Ghana, and their liaison led to waves of Chinese laborers 
relocating to Ghana11. 
 
It is estimated that there are no less than 6,000 Chinese nationals living in Ghana today12. 
Post-2018, the migrants tended to be family members of technocrats already settled in 
Ghana or laborers in the construction and mining industries. For this latter group of migrant 
laborers, the economic prospects back in China looked grim, and the move to Ghana was 
motivated by a desire for a fresh start and a shot at the wealth being generated in Ghana’s 
gold mines and infrastructure projects13. On the surface, such aspirations seem harmless and 
even laudable. But a closer look at the interactions between Chinese workers and their 
Ghanaian counterparts raises concerns about the resurgence of social mechanisms that 
European settlers employed to subjugate Ghanaians in the colonial era. 
 
Christine Choy’s 2016 documentary Reorienting Africa: The Chinese in Ghana explores 
the workplace dynamic between Chinese and Ghanaian construction workers and provides 
insights into the potential power differential between them. In one of the more memorable 
scenes from the documentary, a lead Ghanaian engineer expresses worry about the fact that 
a Chinese construction company that employed sixty Ghanaian workers and forty Chinese 
workers had failed to hire a skilled interpreter to help facilitate effective communication 
between the two groups of employees14. The engineer’s remarks suggested that the Chinese 
workers were more interested in maintaining a separation between themselves and their 
Ghanaian counterparts. The persistence of this separation seemed to foster a power dynamic 
between the Chinese and Ghanaian workers. In this power dynamic, the language barrier 
emerged as a reason for the Chinese workers to answer strictly to, and work directly with, 
their Chinese chain of command rather than collaborate with the Ghanaian lead engineer or 
other Ghanaian workers. Moreover, a closer look at the language with which the Chinese 
workers addressed their Ghanaian counterparts reveals a lot of pejorative gesturing and 
imperative phrasing. Why this is the case is finally reflected in the lead Ghanaian engineer’s 
comments that, since the Chinese have the know-how and the money and it is Ghana that 
needs these resources to support its growth, the subjugation of Ghanaian workers in the 
 
11 Seth Cook, Jixia Lu, Henry Tugendhat, and Dawit Alemu, “Chinese Migrants in Africa: Facts and Fictions 
from the Agri-Food Sector in Ethiopia and Ghana,” World Development 81, (May 2016): 67, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.11.011. 
12 Seth Cook, Jixia Lu, Henry Tugendhat, and Dawit Alemu, 62. 
13 Sophie Song, “A Modern Day Gold Rush - How People Of One County In China Are Making Millions In 
Ghana,” International Business Times, May 15, 2013, https://www.ibtimes.com/modern-day-gold-rush-how-
people-one-county-china-are-making-millions-ghana-1260801. 
14 “Engineer Mohammed Ibn Ahmed explains workplace dynamic and language”, Reorienting Africa: The 
Chinese in Ghana, directed by Christine Choy (2016; New York: Film News Now Foundation, 2016), 
https://video.alexanderstreet.com/watch/reorienting-africa-the-chinese-in-ghana. 
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workplace through this kind of denigrating and ineffective communication emerges as a 
justifiable sacrifice15. In commenting on this situation, New York University professor and 
filmmaker Manthia Diawara remarks that the use of language in this setting seemingly 
reflects the existence of a dominance hierarchy. Diawara argues that countries that harbor a 
superiority complex do not learn the languages of the people they interact with, and the 
Chinese were certainly complicit in that regard. Conversely, the Ghanaian workers’ 
willingness to learn the Chinese language confirms Diawara’s proposition that this 
superiority complex requires members of the subordinate group to learn the language of the 
superior group16.  
 
In the educational realm, an interesting development has been the establishment of a 
Confucius Institute on the University of Ghana’s main campus. Similar to the Alliance 
Française, Goethe Institute, and British Council models of the French, German and British 
cultural missions, China employs this institution to teach Elementary Chinese, Business 
Chinese, Chinese Martial Arts, and Chinese Chopsticks and Tea Culture17. Reports suggest 
that the Confucius Institute also offers private Mandarin lessons all over Ghana’s coastal and 
central regions, particularly in areas where Chinese developmental projects are located like 
the coastal town of Tema that houses a number of energy infrastructure projects18. This, I 
submit, represents the most official form of Chinese cultural influence. The offerings of the 
institute may seem like nurturing of a tolerant and congenial relationship between Ghana 
and China, but a closer look at the curricula reveals a more serious motivation. Both 
Elementary and Business Chinese curricula emphasize that conversations between the 
Chinese and the Ghanaians need to be along strictly economic and work-related lines, and 
are thus likely to feature the kind of imperative and potentially denigrating language used 
by the Chinese workers on the construction site discussed earlier. This point about strictly 
economic and functional relationships between the Chinese and the Ghanaians can be 
further clarified by a look at Ghana’s gig economy.  
 
The gig economy in Ghana, particularly around domestic help and security, has been a 




17 “Confucius Institute Courses at University of Ghana”, University of Ghana, accessed April 6, 2021, 
https://www.ug.edu.gh/announcements/confucius-institute-courses-university-ghana. 
18 “Ghanaian college adopts Chinese language as credit course,” Xinhuanet.com, accessed April 6, 2021, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/03/c_138193507.htm. 
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widespread assumption in this industry that Chinese employers tend to pay higher wages19. 
For the affluent Chinese technocrats, a Ghanaian cleaner or security guard fluent in Mandarin 
is a great asset. What is problematic, however, is the fact that the fluency of these employees 
is often limited to understanding the imperative commands of the employer. As a 
consequence, even the simple act of serving tea, which the Confucius Institute teaches, 
insinuates a dominance hierarchy between the server and served. As Li Xiousong notes in an 
essay on Chinese Tea Culture, “[in the] ancient times, tea-tasting was among the things that 
distinguished men of refinement from men of poor taste. One who was not good at tasting 
tea was usually despised20.” Moreover, Xiousong notes, these ‘men of poor taste’ tended to 
be the ones serving tea to their masters.21 This aspect of Confucius Institute’s literacy 
curriculum that emphasizes communication along strictly economic lines, particularly in 
Ghana’s domestic help economy, raises concerns about an ulterior motive that seeks to re-
socialize a class of Ghanaians into subordinate roles relative to their Chinese counterparts.  
 
In domestic political conversations in Ghana, it is highlighted that Ghana possesses 
extensive natural resources which the country intends to exploit to facilitate its local 
development. In these conversations, China features as an enabler whose role is limited to 
providing technical expertise and machinery22. But in reality, China’s status as a 
manufacturing giant means it needs a steady supply of raw materials, and it is this incentive 
to gain access to raw materials that drives Chinese investments in its relationship with 
Ghana. Current export data suggests that Ghana supplies cocoa, precious metals (gold and 
manganese), and timber to China23. This in itself is not an exploitative relationship. But it 
happens to be the case that whenever Ghana does not submit to Chinese needs, the Chinese 
government resorts to punitive economic measures and forces Ghana to do its bidding. These 
punitive measures typically benefit the Chinese diaspora and are emblematic of the skewed 
nature of the political relationship between the two countries. 
The Chinese government’s power to force the Ghanaian government to bend its rules 
and favor the Chinese diaspora is apparent in Ghana’s small-scale mining sector. Legalized 
 
19 Karsten Giese, and Thiel Alena, “The Vulnerable Other - Distorted Equity in Chinese-Ghanaian Employment 
Relations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 37, no. 6 (May 2012): 1110. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2012.681676. 
20 Li Xiousong, “Chinese Tea Culture,” Journal of Popular Culture 27, no. 2 (September 1993): 76, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-3840.1993.00075.x. 
21 Xiousong, “Chinese Tea Culture,” 79. 
22 Richard Aidoo, “The Political Economy of Galamsey and Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Ghana,” African Studies 
Quarterly 16, no. 3/4 (December 2016): 56, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1863559417/. 
23 “Ghana Exports to China,” Trading Economics, assessed April 6, 2021, 
https://tradingeconomics.com/ghana/exports/china; “Ghana Import from China,” Trading Economics, 
assessed April 6, 2021; https://tradingeconomics.com/ghana/imports/china. 
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by the Ghanaian government in 1989, small-scale mining was meant to be a source of income 
for Ghana’s rural population. The Minerals and Mining Act of 2006 further protected this 
privilege by preventing foreigners from purchasing mining land smaller than twenty-five 
acres24. This legislation ensured that access to small-scale mining was limited to local 
populations. However, in 2013, it came to national attention that Chinese miners, some of 
them illegal, had successfully acquired swaths of mining land and started mining operations 
in prohibited areas. It also emerged that the chemicals used in these mining operations had 
ended up polluting many of the water bodies in that area. When Ghanaian officials reported 
the incident to the Chinese embassy, the embassy was quick to censure them because their 
actions were seen as a threat to the political relationship between China and Ghana. 
Responding to the outrage, the Ghanaian government deported 713 of these illegal miners. 
The Chinese government retaliated by imposing visa restrictions on Ghanaian citizens25. The 
China Development Bank went one step further and stalled its disbursement of a $3 billion 
infrastructure loan to Ghana26. Of course the Chinese government in this case was 
responding to its economic interests and looking after its citizens in Ghana. But does this 
need for the Chinese government to cater to its diaspora necessarily entail punishing Ghana 
even when members of this diaspora are involved in illegal activities? 
 
A stronger explanation of the Chinese government’s punitive actions against Ghana to 
protect its diaspora could emerge from an understanding of the implications of China’s 
economic evolution. As confirmed by Wilson Wu, a Chinese engineer who relocated to Africa 
to start a business, the climate on the African continent is “like the China of [the seventies 
and nineties] when you could open a business and maybe earn a fortune...those kinds of 
fortunes are not possible in China today27.” Economic exiles such as Wu are symptomatic of 
a phenomenon that unfolded in China as it became an economic superpower: China’s 
economic growth denied large swathes of its population a chance to join the middle class, 
and forced many of these disenfranchised people to go into economic self-exile and take 
refuge in places like Ghana28. Could it be that by taking punitive actions against Ghana, the 
Chinese government is guaranteeing the incorporation of these exiled and disenfranchised 
 
24 Aidoo, “The Political Economy of Galamsey and Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Ghana,” 60. 





26Aidoo, “The Political Economy of Galamsey and Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Ghana,” 61- 63. 
27 Emily Feng, and David Pilling, “The Other Side of Chinese Investment In Africa,” Financial Times, March 26 
2019, https://www.ft.com/content/9f5736d8-14e1-11e9-a581-4ff78404524e. 
28 Cheng Li, China’s Emerging Middle Class: Beyond Economic Transformation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2010), 291. 
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nationals into its globalizing economy through a sort of proxy-state arrangement? It should 
be noted that China’s status as a global economic power grants it the possibility of aligning 
itself with such an economic agenda. Moreover, China possesses the capability to obscure 
this evidently exploitative agenda by alluding to its shared past with Ghana as a developing 
nation. Imperialism has taken more obvious forms in the past, from British naval conquests 
to slavery, but imperialism reincarnated in the Chinese form could constitute a more sinister 
and clandestine form of domination29.  
 
Another story from Reorienting Africa confirms the plausibility of the above logic. Shu 
Jingping migrated to Ghana in the 1990s with the hope of selling mobile phones and making 
a better life for herself as her economic prospects in China looked grim. After moving to 
Ghana, Jingping sensed an opportunity in another industry: on learning that all the paint used 
in Chinese developmental projects in Ghana is imported from China, she decided to enter the 
paint business. The business turned out to be a success; Jingping became wealthy and 
employed two Ghanaian girls. When Jinping was asked about her experiences in Ghana, she 
confirmed the widely believed stereotype that blacks [Ghanaians] were viewed as 
unintelligent and lazy by their Chinese counterparts. One can observe through this 
commentary the kind of shift that Edward Said identified in the case of the early white 
settlers in Africa: these white migrants gained positions of power, lost the label of ‘exile’, and 
acquired the ability to exert prejudices upon their new subordinates. When the interviewer 
asked Jingping why she had so many dogs in her house, she remarked that it was because 
she lived in a black neighborhood, implying that they are meant for protection and 
confirming the hint of criminality associated with black people30. Jingping’s story is 
emblematic of the experiences of the Chinese diaspora in Ghana which includes not just 
professionals and their family members but miners and construction workers as well. These 
migrants came to Ghana in search of better economic prospects and contributed to the 
Ghanaian economy by building restaurants, hospitals, and supermarkets31. However, in many 
cases, they also become conduits for China to tighten its political, economic, and cultural grip 
on Ghana, warranting concerns about a diaspora-led Chinese imperialism. 
 
An evaluation of labor relations between Ghanaian workers and their Chinese 
counterparts in the construction, mining, education, and gig economy sectors suggests 
 
29 Daniel Spence, Colonial Naval Culture and British Imperialism, 1922–67 (Manchester, UK: Manchester 
University Press, 2015), 79. 
30 “Shu Jingping explains life in Ghana ,” Reorienting Africa: The Chinese in Ghana, directed by Christine Choy 
(2016; New York: Film News Now Foundation, 2016), https://video.alexanderstreet.com/watch/reorienting-
africa-the-chinese-in-ghana. 
31 Song, “Modern Day Gold Rush.” 
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undertones of discrimination and a desire to subjugate and exploit rather than cooperate 
with the Ghanaians. The role of language as a tool for exerting superiority is revealed in the 
interactions between the Chinese and the Ghanaians both in the workplace and in the 
domestic sphere. On top of this, the Ghanaian government remains beholden to Chinese 
economic interests that are fostered by the Chinese diaspora. The Chinese government has 
certainly made it clear that its interests are economic. However, without the support of the 
Chinese diaspora in Ghana, the Chinese efforts in the country, and in the continent at large, 
are unlikely to succeed. It is this crucial role of the diaspora in advancing Chinese interests 
that supports our assertion that the Chinese diaspora in Ghana constitutes a burgeoning 





Aidoo, Richard. “The Political Economy of Galamsey and Anti-Chinese Sentiment in Ghana.” 
African Studies Quarterly 16, no. 3/4 (December 2016): 55–72. 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1863559417/. 
 
American Enterprise Institute. “Chinese Investments and Contracts in Ghana (2005-2019).” 
China Global Investment Tracker. Accessed April 6, 2021. https://www.aei.org/china-
global-investment-tracker/. 
 
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1973. 
 
Carmody, Padraig. “Dependence Not Debt-Trap Diplomacy.” Area Development and Policy 
5, no. 1 (2020): 23–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/23792949.2019.1702471. 
 
China Africa Research Initiative. “Data: Chinese Workers in Africa.” Accessed April 6, 2021. 
http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-workers-in-africa.  
 
Choy, Christine, dir. Reorienting Africa: The Chinese in Ghana. 2016; New York: Film News 
Now Foundation, 2016. https://video-alexanderstreet-
com.dartmouth.idm.oclc.org/watch/reorienting-africa-the-chinese-in-ghana. 
 
Conner, Walker. “The Impact of Homelands Upon Diasporas.” In Modern Diaspora in 
International Politics,16-46. Edited by Gabriel Sheffer. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986. 
 
 10 
Cook, Seth, Jixia Lu, Henry Tugendhat, and Dawit Alemu. “Chinese Migrants in Africa: Facts 
and Fictions from the Agri-Food Sector in Ethiopia and Ghana.” World Development 81 
(May 2016): 61–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2015.11.011. 
 
Feng, Emily, and Pilling, David. “The Other Side of Chinese Investment in Africa.” Financial 
Times, March 26, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/9f5736d8-14e1-11e9-a581-
4ff78404524e. 
 
Giese, Karsten, and Alena Thiel. “The Vulnerable Other - Distorted Equity in Chinese-
Ghanaian Employment Relations.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 37, no. 6 (May 2012): 1101–
1120. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2012.681676. 
 
Hirsch, Afua. “Ghana Deports Thousands in Crackdown on Illegal Chinese Gold Miners.” The 






Li, Cheng. China’s Emerging Middle Class: Beyond Economic Transformation. Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010. 
 
Kernen, Antoine, and Katy N. Lam. “Workforce Localization among Chinese State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) in Ghana.” The Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 90 (November 
2014): 1053–1072. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2014.898894. 
 
Mararike, Munoda. “The New Scramble for Africa: Re Colonising the Continent.” In 
Zimbabwe Will Never Be A Colony Again!: Sanctions and Anti-Imperialist Struggles in 
Zimbabwe, 257-66. Mankon, Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG, 2019. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvmd84jt.14. 
 
Said, Edward. “Reflections in Exile.” In Reflections on Exile and Other Essays, 173-186. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. 
 
Song, Sophie. “A Modern-Day Gold Rush - How People of One County in China are Making 





Spence, Daniel. Colonial Naval Culture and British Imperialism, 1922–67. Manchester, UK: 
Manchester University Press, 2015. 
 
Tang, Xiaoyang. “8 Geese Flying to Ghana? A Case Study of the Impact of Chinese 
Investments on Africa’s Manufacturing Sector.” Journal of Contemporary China 27, no. 114 
(November 2018): 924–41. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1488106. 
 
Trading Economics. “Ghana Exports to China.” Accessed April 6, 2021. 
https://tradingeconomics.com/ghana/exports/china. 
 
Trading Economics. “Ghana Imports from China.” Accessed April 6, 2021. 
https://tradingeconomics.com/ghana/imports/china. 
 
University of Ghana. “Confucius Institute Courses at The University of Ghana.” Accessed 
April 6, 2021. https://www.ug.edu.gh/announcements/confucius-institute-courses-
university-ghana. 
 
Xinhuanet. “Ghanaian College adopts Chinese Language as Credit Course.” Accessed April 6, 
2021. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/03/c_138193507.htm. 
 
Xiousong, Li. “Chinese Tea Culture.” Journal of Popular Culture 27, no. 2 (September 1993): 
75–90. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-3840.1993.00075.x. 
 
 
